The weight of truth: Lessons for minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy argument by Button, Timothy
The weight of truth: 
Lessons for minimalists from Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument
Tim Button
button@cantab.net
This is a preprint of a Paper accepted for publication in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society © 2014.
Truth can seem mysterious. Paul Horwich’s minimalism claims to dissolve all appearance of
mystery, telling us that the concept of truth is exhausted by a single scheme: 
MT. The proposition that p is true iﬀ p
Nothing, it seems, could be simpler. Unfortunately, there are subtle diﬃculties with treating
MT as a scheme, in anything like the ordinary sense. In the end, these diﬃculties lead to the
demise of minimalism about truth.
Just as there are minimalists about truth, so there are minimalists about reference and
satisfaction. Where minimalists about truth focus on propositions, minimalists about
reference and satisfaction focus on propositional constituents. But minimalists of all stripes
encounter very similar problems. Indeed, their diﬃculties arise from foundational issues
concerning propositions and propositional constituents. These points can be traced back to
Bertrand Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument. 
I therefore begin my case against minimalism by introducing the idea of a
propositional constituent and extracting some lessons from the Gray’s Elegy argument (§I).
I then introduce minimalism about reference (§II), and show how it is undermined by the
Gray’s-Elegy-inspired lessons (§III). The argument against minimalism about reference is
easy to translate into an argument against minimalism about truth and satisfaction (§IV).
Moreover, this argument helps us to understand one of Donald Davidson’s arguments
against minimalism (§V). I close by rejecting three possible responses which the minimalist
might try to make (§§VI–VIII), and by attempting to demotivate minimalism (§IX). 
I. Three lessons from Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument
In this paper, I raise problems for minimalists via foundational considerations which can be
traced back to Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument. This section aims to introduce these
foundational considerations. I start by briefly introducing the idea of a propositional
constituent. I then present the Gray’s Elegy argument. And I close the section by drawing
three lessons which will be relevant for my subsequent discussion of minimalism.
Propositions and their constituents. Suppose we think of propositions as in some way composed
out of various entities. For example, we might think that the proposition that Hesperus
rotates has a constituent which denotes, refers to, or picks out Hesperus. It is customary to
indicate this constituent thus: ⟨Hesperus⟩. In general, then, angled brackets are supposed to
introduce us to propositional constituents. In the simplest case, where an entire sentence is
enclosed between angled brackets, we are introduced to a fully fledged proposition. So,
deploying our new notation, we can say that ⟨Hesperus⟩ is a constituent of ⟨Hesperus
rotates⟩ (i.e. of the proposition that Hesperus rotates).
This use of angled brackets is entirely ubiquitous among philosophers discussing
minimalism. Marian David (2008, p. 287) suggests a helpful way to think about their
intended use: just as quotation marks typically indicate semantic ascent, so angled brackets are
supposed to indicate intensional ascent. Of course, one might have many questions about
intensional ascent — indeed, the central message of this paper is that the use of angled
brackets has led minimalists astray — but for now, let us proceed. 
We have said that ⟨Hesperus⟩ is to be a constituent of ⟨Hesperus rotates⟩. But we now
face a crucial (and familiar) decision-point, concerning how we should think of propositions
and their constituents. Astronomical observations tell us that Hesperus = Phosphorus; but
does ⟨Hesperus⟩ = ⟨Phosphorus⟩, and does ⟨Hesperus rotates⟩ = ⟨Phosphorus rotates⟩?
It is easy to motivate a negative answer to these questions. No observations were
needed to determine the truth of ⟨Hesperus = Hesperus⟩, but it required serious eﬀort to
show that ⟨Hesperus = Phosphorus⟩ was true. As such, we might well want to say that these
are diﬀerent propositions. And since they diﬀer only in that one contains ⟨Hesperus⟩ where
the other contains ⟨Phosphorus⟩, we shall also say that ⟨Hesperus⟩ ≠ ⟨Phosphorus⟩. For
similar reasons, we shall say that ⟨Hesperus rotates⟩ ≠ ⟨Phosphorus rotates⟩.
Call this the broadly Fregean approach to propositions and propositional constituents. It
is only broadly Fregean, since you can follow this approach whilst disagreeing with Frege’s
detailed account of sense. What the approach preserves is just Frege’s claim, that ⟨Hesperus
rotates⟩ ≠ ⟨Phosphorus rotates⟩ and that ⟨Hesperus⟩ ≠ ⟨Phosphorus⟩.
Summarising the Gray’s Elegy argument. It is at this point that Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument gets
going (1905, pp. 485–7). I shall outline the argument, following Michael Potter’s (2000, pp.
124–5) reconstruction very closely.
One might, naively, think that angled brackets indicated a one-place function, so that,
in general, if a = b then ⟨a⟩ = ⟨b⟩. (For comparison, consider how we use curly brackets in set
theory.) However, given a broadly Fregean approach to propositional constituents, this is
mistaken: ⟨Hesperus⟩ ≠ ⟨Phosphorus⟩ even though Hesperus = Phosphorus. Potter
summarises this point as follows:
The notation ‘⟨c⟩’ is misleading: ⟨c⟩ does not depend functionally on c. (Potter
2000, p. 124).1
1 Potter has ‘it’ after the semicolon, where I have ‘⟨c⟩’. Potter also uses a capital ‘C’ where I use ‘c’; I have 
silently adjusted this, and all subsequent quotations, from Potter.
Evidently it will not do to employ misleading notation. But, we should not be too quick to do
away with angled brackets. Recall that we wanted to say that there is some relationship
between ⟨Hesperus⟩ and Hesperus: the former refers to, or denotes, or picks out the latter.
And we shall want to generalise this thought, oﬀering something like the scheme: ⟨c⟩ denotes
c. Unfortunately, the generality of this scheme requires the use of angled brackets (or some
similar notational expedient). As Potter points out:
If we use a new symbol [in place of ‘⟨c⟩’] , say ‘d’, then we have to express the
relationship we want by saying that d denotes c. This is no longer in any way
explanatory of the general relationship which we wanted to describe, but has to
be expressed afresh for each denoting concept d. (Potter 2000, p. 124)
We seem, then, to be forced to use angled brackets; but we must find a way to avoid being
misled by them. Potter continues:
The most natural way for us to designate ⟨c⟩, of course, is as the meaning of ‘c’,
but ‘the meaning of “c”’ is not a function of c any more than ⟨c⟩ is: it is rather a
function of the phrase ‘c’, so if we try to express what we want by saying that the
meaning of ‘c’ denotes c, we are making the relationship between meaning and
denotation ‘linguistic through the phrase’. (Potter 2000, pp. 124–5; Potter’s
emphasis)2
At this point, Russell insisted that ‘the relationship of meaning and denotation is not merely
linguistic through the phrase: there must be a logical relation involved’ (1905, p. 486). This
is the Gray’s Elegy argument, against a broadly Fregean approach to propositional
constituents. 
For his own part, of course, Russell is associated with a position according to which
Hesperus itself is the propositional constituent in the proposition ⟨Hesperus rotates⟩. Indeed,
on a broadly Russellian approach to propositional constituents, we would be led to say that
⟨Hesperus⟩ = Hesperus = Phosphorus = ⟨Phosphorus⟩. At this point, the use of angled
brackets would cease to be misleading — after all ⟨c⟩ now trivially depends functionally on c
— but they would be entirely redundant.
Three lessons from the Gray’s Elegy argument. One might think that the Gray’s Elegy argument
undermines any broadly Fregean approach to propositional constituents. I make no such
claim. I have rehearsed the Gray’s Elegy argument, only because I think that it provides three
important lessons for anyone who embraces a broadly Fregean approach. These lessons are
as follows: 
2 Note, too, that the meaning of ‘c’ is not a function of c; and, indeed, that ‘c’  is not a function of c. This latter 
point forms the locus of Read’s (1997) discussion of a puzzle due to Reach (1938) and Anscombe (1957).
Lesson 1. The use of angled brackets is potentially misleading, since ⟨c⟩ is not a function
of c.
Lesson 2. However, abandoning the use of angled brackets altogether would leave us
unable to say anything general about reference.
Lesson 3. The best explanation of the use of angled brackets makes intensional ascent
depend upon semantic ascent, as follows:
⟨…⟩ =df the meaning of ‘…’ (in this language)
Of course, this does not alter the fact that ⟨c⟩ is not a function of c.
I shall invoke these three lessons several times in what follows, to argue against minimalism
about reference, truth, and satisfaction, in that order.
II. Minimalism about reference, and the challenge of comprehensiveness
The preceding discussion is immediately relevant to the first minimalist position that I shall
consider: Horwich’s minimalism about reference.
Minimalists about reference think that propositional constituents are the primary
referring entities. Moreover, minimalists think that it is relatively easy to know everything
there is to know about reference. In particular, they believe that everything there is to know
about reference is exhausted by the following scheme (Horwich 1998, pp. 116, 130):
MR. ∀x(⟨c⟩ refers to x iﬀ c = x)
(This is obviously in the same ballpark as the scheme ‘⟨c⟩ refers to c’, mentioned in §I.
However, it is a slight improvement, since it allows for the possibility of reference failure, as
when we substitute ‘Pegasus’ for ‘c’.) 
By rolling up everything into a single scheme, the minimalist seeks to demystify
reference. There is, however, an immediate diﬃculty with the thought that MR exhausts
everything there is to know about reference. There are propositional constituents which
cannot be expressed in this language. (To take a simple example: this language does not
contain a name for each and every real number.) Consequently, there are propositional
constituents whose reference condition cannot be specified by any instance (in this language) of
MR.3 So the theory of reference which consists of all the instances (in this language) of MR is
not comprehensive, in the sense that it does not provide us with a reference condition for every
propositional constituent that (putatively) refers. 
3 A reference condition is a statement of what (if anything) a (putatively) referring entity refers to. (Compare the
notion of a reference condition with the the notion of a proposition’s truth condition.) A reference condition 
is sometimes called a reference, but then we must distinguish between the reference and the referent (the denoted
object), which is apt to confuse.
The minimalist’s theory of reference must, though, be comprehensive. After all, if there
is some propositional constituent which refers, but whose reference condition the minimalist
cannot specify, then clearly the minimalist has not told us everything there is to know about
reference. (I discuss a further reason for the minimalist to require comprehensiveness in
§VIII.)
The minimalist therefore faces a challenge: she must find a way to provide a
comprehensive theory, without giving up on MR. For the bulk of this paper, I shall explore
one response to this challenge (I consider an alternative response in §VII). The response I
shall consider is Horwich’s own preferred response to the challenge of comprehensiveness,
and it is inadequate. (More precisely, in fact, this is Horwich’s (1998, pp. 17–20) preferred
response in the case of minimalism about truth. However, it would be remarkable if he were
to treat the case of reference diﬀerently, and it is easy to translate his response across.)
Aware of the challenge of comprehensiveness, Horwich denies that MR should be
treated as an axiom scheme in the ordinary sense. Rather, Horwich maintains that MR
illustrates a certain general structure that propositions can have. That propositional structure is a
‘single one-place function’ (1998, p. 19n3), which we can illustrate even more clearly as:
⟨∀x(⟨c⟩ refers to x iﬀ c = x)⟩
The minimalist’s theory of reference is then generated as follows: its axioms are exactly those
propositions that result from inputting each and every (putatively referring) propositional
constituent into this one-place function. Thus, if one inputs ⟨Hesperus⟩ into this function,
one obtains ⟨∀x(⟨Hesperus⟩ refers to x iﬀ Hesperus = x)⟩. Crucially, though, the input to this
function can be any propositional constituent, rather than just those which are expressible in
this language. 
In brief, then, the minimalist about reference claims to answer the challenge of
comprehensiveness by appealing to a ‘one-place function (the propositional structure)’
which can be applied to any propositional constituent (Horwich 1998, p. 19n3). In what
follows, I show that this is untenable.
III. Applying the lessons from the Gray’s Elegy argument
So far, the minimalist has not yet declared in favour of either a broadly Fregean or Russellian
approach to propositional constituents. Horwich himself explicitly accepts the existence of
both kinds of propositional constituents (1998, pp. 90–2). Indeed, he claims that
minimalism will be the correct theory of truth for either kind of proposition (1998, p. 17).
I return to this claim in §IV and §VI. For now, it suﬃces to note that minimalism
cannot be the correct theory of reference for Russellian propositional constituents. As we saw in §I,
on a Russellian approach to propositional constituents, angled brackets are redundant.
Accordingly, the Russellian approach would have us read MR as:
MR1. ∀x(c refers to x iﬀ c = x)
This tells us, absurdly, that objects always and only refer to themselves. 
Of course, the Russellian approach is not the only alternative to a broadly Fregean
approach. An alternative would be a position according to which ⟨Hesperus⟩ ≠ Hesperus,
but ⟨Hesperus⟩ = ⟨Phosphorus⟩. More generally, on this approach, angled brackets would
represent a function  according to which ⟨a⟩ = ⟨b⟩ iﬀ a = b. On such an approach to
propositional constituents, however, it will evidently be easy to eliminate any use of the
predicate ‘refers’. And so this approach to propositional constituents will lead, not to
minimalism about reference, but to a redundancy theory of reference.
Consequently, minimalists about reference must adopt a broadly Fregean approach to
propositional constituents. And, as such, the three lessons from the Gray’s Elegy argument
apply. 
Concerning Lesson 1. Given a broadly Fregean approach to propositional constituents, ⟨c⟩ is not
a function of c. Consequently, the use of angled brackets in MR is potentially misleading. This
is just Lesson 1 of the Gray’s Elegy argument.
The potential to mislead is not, unfortunately, just an abstract possibility. In §II, our
minimalist responded to the challenge of comprehensiveness by claiming that MR indicates a
particular propositional structure — a ‘single one-place function’ — which takes as inputs
any propositional constituent (including those we cannot express). However, MR would
indicate a one-place function if, and only if, angled brackets indicated a one-place function.
We have just seen that they do not. The minimalist, then, has been misled by her own
notational devices.
(Actually, the argument which I have just given involves a very slight
oversimplification. Here is the unsimplified argument. Suppose the minimalist theory is to
consist of Russellian propositions which provide the reference conditions for Fregean
propositional constituents. Then the minimal theory should contain the Russellian
proposition that ∀x(⟨Hesperus⟩ refers to x iﬀ Hesperus = x) (with angled brackets still
indicating Fregean propositional constituents). Since this is a Russellian proposition, it has
Hesperus as one constituent, and ⟨Hesperus⟩ as another. And, since there is no ‘backward
road’ (Russell 1905, p. 487) from Hesperus to ⟨Hesperus⟩, the problem is as stated above.
But suppose, instead, that the minimalist theory is to consist of Fregean propositions which
provide the reference conditions for Fregean propositional constituents. Then the
proposition in question will have ⟨Hesperus⟩ as one constituent, and ⟨⟨Hesperus⟩⟩ as
another. Nevertheless, there is still no ‘backward road’ from ⟨Hesperus⟩ to ⟨⟨Hesperus⟩⟩: it
is illuminating to discover that ⟨Hesperus⟩ is Tim’s favourite propositional constituent —
just as it is illuminating to discover that Hesperus is Phosphorus — so that ⟨⟨Hesperus⟩⟩ ≠
⟨Tim’s favourite propositional constituent⟩. So MR still cannot indicate a one-place
function.)
Concerning Lesson 2. Given the potential to mislead, we might try to use a new symbol in place
of ‘⟨c⟩’ in MR, which does not suggest a functional dependence on c. For example, we might
use some primitive new symbol ‘d’. We would then have to rewrite MR as follows:
MR2. ∀x(d refers to x iﬀ c = x)
This scheme illustrates a two-place function, with gaps marked by ‘d’ and ‘c’. However,
absurdity follows very quickly indeed, if we are allowed to input absolutely any pairs of
propositional constituents into this function. Accordingly, the minimalist must impose some
restrictions on which pairs of inputs are permissible.
What the minimalist will want to say, of course, is that the only permissible pairs of
inputs are such that the first refers to the second. However, if the minimalist oﬀers this as an
explicit constraint in specifying her minimal theory of reference, then she will have invoked
precisely the concept that she was trying to deflate away, undercutting her own aims.
The minimalist might try to maintain that her theory of reference consists of all correct
instances of the two-place function illustrated by MR2, whilst adding that nothing more can
be said about which instances are correct. This, however, is to give up on minimalism. If
there is nothing in common between the propositions in the minimal theory of truth beyond
their inexplicable correctness, then we will have given up on any hope of systematically specifying
any general relationship of reference.
In short, since the minimalist wants to keep the general relationship of reference in
view, she must rely upon angled brackets in formulating her theory. This is just Lesson 2
from the Gray’s Elegy argument.
Concerning Lesson 3. Since the minimalist must employ angled brackets, we are still owed an
explanation of their meaning. And the most natural thought is as follows: propositional
constituents are first introduced to us just as what certain phrases express. Consequently, the
most natural explanation of angled brackets will be ‘linguistic through the phrase’; it will
make intensional ascent depend upon semantic ascent. Indeed, Horwich himself explicitly
makes intensional ascent depend upon semantic ascent, declaring: 
I am employing the convention that surrounding any expression, e, with angled
brackets, ‘⟨’ and ‘⟩’, produces an expression referring to the propositional constituent
expressed by e. (Horwich 1998, p. 18n3; see also his 2009b, p. 87n8.)
Otherwise put, Horwich oﬀers the following definition:
⟨…⟩ =df the propositional constituent expressed by ‘…’ (in this language)
This is just Lesson 3 from the Gray’s Elegy argument.
The demise of minimalism. Given Lesson 3, we should rewrite MR as follows:
MRL. ∀x(the propositional constituent expressed by ‘c’ (in this language) refers to x iﬀ c
= x)
But, with MR thus unpacked, we must now revisit the minimalist’s answer to the challenge of
comprehensiveness from §II. The minimalist held that we should not treat MRL (i.e. MR) as an
axiom scheme in the conventional sense. Rather, we should treat MRL as illustrating a one-place
function. The axioms of the minimalist’s theory of reference are then exactly those
propositions that result from inputting each and every (putatively referring) propositional
constituent into this one-place function. 
Unfortunately for the minimalist, MRL does not point to a one-place function, any more
than does MR. This is immediate from the fact that the propositional constituent expressed by
‘c’ (in this language) is not a function of c.
(As before, this is a very slight oversimplification. Here is the unsimplified version. If
the minimalist theory consists of Russellian propositions which provide reference conditions
for Fregean propositional constituents, then the problem is as just stated. If the minimalist
theory consists of Fregean propositions which provide reference conditions for Fregean
propositional constituents, then the problem is just that there is no backward road from
⟨Hesperus⟩ to ⟨the (Fregean) propositional constituent expressed by ‘Hesperus’ (in this
language)⟩.)
At this point, I expect that the minimalist will ask us to allow her a grain of salt in her
attempt to specify her theory of reference. Surely, she might protest, I understand what MRL is
getting at?
When it comes to instances of MRL in this language, I am happy to grant the grain of
salt. I am happy to concede that MRL successfully specifies a reference condition for every
propositional constituents which is expressible in this language. After all, the reference
condition for ⟨c⟩ is given to me with a clause which is linguistic through the phrase ‘c’ in this
language, and I am happy to concede that all such clauses are intelligible. Crucially, though,
MRL leaves me entirely at sea, when it comes to propositional constituents are inexpressible in
this language to me (at least in principle). After all, whenever this language lacks the means to
express a constituent, that constituent’s reference condition can hardly be specified by
mentioning some phrase which, when used in this language, expresses that constituent!
Consequently, MRL cannot even begin to gesture at a reference condition for propositions
which cannot be expressed in this language. The challenge of comprehensiveness is
completely unanswered.
Here, then, is the problem for minimalists in a nutshell. The minimalist position relies
upon intensional ascent, which is conventionally symbolised with angled brackets. Since
minimalists must be broadly Fregean about propositional constituents, they must explain
intensional ascent in terms of semantic ascent in this language. But in that case, they cannot
address the challenge of comprehensiveness. 
IV. Minimalism about truth
This concludes my case against minimalism about reference. I now want to show that
essentially the same problem arises for minimalism about truth. This should be no surprise,
given the intimate connection between truth and reference. However, it is worth spelling out
the problem in a little detail.
The challenge of comprehensiveness. Horwich’s minimalism about truth involves the scheme (e.g.
1998, pp. 17–20):
MT. ⟨p⟩ is true iﬀ p
The minimalist’s theory of truth must, though, be comprehensive, in the sense that it must
provide a truth condition for each truth bearer. And this a serious challenge, since certain
truths cannot be expressed in this language. 
As such, and as in §II, the minimalist maintains that MT indicates a propositional
structure: a single one-place function that can be applied to every proposition to generate its
truth condition. Since the propositions that we input into this propositional structure are not
limited to those which are expressible in this language, the minimalist thereby claims to have
answered the challenge of comprehensiveness.
Which approach to propositions? The minimalist must now consider how she should conceive of
propositions. 
We saw in §III that a Russellian approach to propositional constituents immediately
yields a patently absurd theory of reference. A Russellian approach to propositions will not
yield a patently absurd theory of truth (at least, not obviously). However, the theory of truth
will not look particularly minimalist. After all, to be on the road to a correspondence theory
(or perhaps an identity theory) of truth, very little more is required than that Hesperus is a
component of ⟨Hesperus rotates⟩. Hartry Field has stated this problem very nicely:
Russell viewed atomic propositions as complexes consisting of an n-place
relation and n objects, in some definite order. But an account of truth for such
propositions is obvious: Such a proposition is true iﬀ the objects taken in that
order stand in the relation. It can hardly be a matter of philosophical controversy
whether this definition of truth is correct, given the notion of proposition in
question, so what is there for the minimalist and the full-blooded
correspondence theorist to disagree about? (Field 1992, p. 323)
This gives a prima facie reason for the minimalist to adopt the Fregean account of
propositions. It is, though, only a prima facie reason. After all, there may be alternative
approaches to propositions which are not broadly Fregean, but which equally avoid thinking
that ⟨Hesperus rotates⟩ consists of the ordered pair of Rotation and Hesperus.4 I shall revisit
this matter in §VI. For now, I shall take it that the minimalist about truth should focus on
Fregean propositions. Consequently, we can apply the lessons from the Gray’s Elegy
Argument.
Concerning Lesson 1. Given a broadly Fregean approach to propositions, ⟨Hesperus rotates⟩ is
distinct from ⟨Phosphorus rotates⟩. As such, neither proposition depends functionally upon
the rotation of Hesperus (i.e. Phosphorus), and so the use of angled brackets — or,
equivalently, unreflective use of the phrase ‘the proposition that…’ — is potentially
misleading. Indeed, it has already misled the minimalist. Her answer to the challenge of
comprehensiveness involved the claim that MT indicated a one-place function. But it could
do this if, and only if, angled brackets marked some function.
Concerning Lesson 2. To avoid being misled, we might consider a two place function:
MT2. q is true iﬀ p
However, the inputs to this function would need to be somehow constrained. Reflecting
upon this point, it is clear that the minimalist must use angled brackets, if she wants to retain
any hope of systematically specifying some general conception of truth.
Concerning Lesson 3. The minimalist still owes us an explanation of these angled brackets. The
natural thing to do, of course, is just to explain intensional ascent via semantic ascent. And
this is exactly what Horwich suggests (see above).
The demise of minimalism. Given how we are to read angled brackets, scheme MT becomes:
MTL. the proposition expressed by ‘p’ (in this language) is true iﬀ p
Of course, this cannot indicate a one-place function. More generally, since it involves
semantic ascent in this language, it cannot help us concerning truth conditions for
propositions which cannot be expressed in this language. Thus, minimalism about truth fails
to address the challenge of comprehensiveness. 
Minimalism about satisfaction. The argument against minimalism about truth is concluded.
Before moving on, though, it is worth broadening the argument. Minimalists treat truth as a
property of propositions; propositions are expressed by sentences; and sentences are just
zero-place predicates. So minimalism about truth is just minimalism about zero-place
satisfaction. This observation suggests that we might consider minimalism about satisfaction
more generally. 
4 Though Field (1992, pp. 322–3) also points out that regarding propositions as sets of possible worlds is 
unlikely to yield a distinctively minimalist thesis.
The next simplest case to consider is minimalism about satisfaction of one-place
predicate-like propositional constituents. To just this end, Horwich (1998, pp. 116, 130)
suggests the following scheme:
MS. ∀x(x satisfies ⟨F⟩ iﬀ Fx)
Similar schemes could be given to deal with satisfaction of n-place predicate-like
propositional constituents (for arbitrary n). But it is obvious that all such proposals will face
the same problems as faced by the minimalist about truth: they cannot address the challenge
of comprehensiveness.
V. Davidson on minimalism
I have constructed my argument against minimalism around three lessons which I extracted
from Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument. However, I could equally well have built my argument
around one of Davidson’s objections against minimalism. That objection is fascinating, but
highly compressed; indeed, it is suﬃciently compressed for me to want to quote it in full:
How are we to understand phrases like ‘the proposition that Socrates is wise’? In
giving a standard account of the semantics of the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’, we
make use of what the name ‘Socrates’ names, and of the entities of which the
predicate ‘is wise’ is true. But how can we use these semantic features of the
sentence ‘Socrates is wise’ to yield the reference of ‘the proposition that Socrates
is wise’? Horwich does not give us any guidance here. Could we say that
expressions like ‘the proposition that Socrates is wise’ are semantically
unstructured, or at least that after the words ‘the proposition that’ (taken as a
functional expression) a sentence becomes a semantically unstructured name of
the proposition it expresses? Taking this course would leave us with an infinite
primitive vocabulary, and the appearance of the words ‘Socrates is wise’ in two
places in the schema would be of no help in understanding the schema or its
instances. A further proposal might be to modify our instance of the schema to
read:
The proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’ is true if and
only if Socrates is wise.
But following this idea would require relativizing the quoted sentence to a
language, a need that Horwich must circumvent.
So let me put my objection briefly as follows: the same sentence appears twice in
instances of Horwich’s schema, once after the words ‘the proposition that’, in a
context that requires the result to be a singular term, the subject of a predicate,
and once as an ordinary sentence. We cannot eliminate this iteration of the same
sentence without destroying all appearance of a theory. But we cannot understand
the result of the iteration unless we can see how to make use of the same
semantic features of the repeated sentence in both of its appearances—make use
of them in giving the semantics of the schema instances. I do not see how this
can be done. (Davidson 1996, pp. 273–4)
Horwich has published two replies to Davidson’s objection (2001, pp. 153–4; 2009a, pp.
53–6; see also his 1998, p. 133). Whilst these responses diﬀer slightly, both assume that
Davidson’s challenge merely evinces ‘a squeamishness about Fregean “that”-clauses’ (2009a,
p. 55). More precisely, Horwich thinks that Davidson has simply raised the following worry: 
‘That’-clauses cannot be regarded as referring expressions, because there is no
way of seeing how their referents would be determined by the referents of their
component words. (Horwich 2009a, p. 53; see also 2001, pp. 152–3; 2009c, p.
76n20)
As a result, Horwich’s main line of response against Davidson’s objection is simply to explain
how intensional ascent works. Naturally, he glosses it in terms of semantic ascent (in this
language).
I think that Horwich has misunderstood Davidson’s objection. A page before the
lengthy quotation just oﬀered, Davidson has praised Horwich, on the grounds that Horwich
seems ‘to have accepted the challenge other deflationists have evaded, that of saying
something more about an unrelativized concept of truth than we can learn from Tarski’s
definitions’ (1996, p. 272). But, in the lengthy quoted passage, Davidson maintains that
Horwich will end up with a relativized concept of truth after all, if intensional ascent is
articulated in terms of semantic ascent. None of this discussion of relativization has
anything, though, to do with a general ‘squeamishness about Fregean “that”-clauses’.
We reach a much better understanding of Davidson’s objection, if we read him as
advancing something close to the argument I presented in §IV. Indeed, Davidson’s objection
makes use of all three of the lessons that I extracted from the Gray’s Elegy argument.
Concerning Lesson 1. Davidson starts by worrying that there is no direct route to ⟨Socrates is
wise⟩ from Socrates (‘what the name “Socrates” names’) and Wisdom (or rather, ‘the entities
of which the predicate “is wise” is true’). 
Although Davidson does not make this explicit, the worry is really only made serious
given a broadly Fregean approach to propositions. Indeed, on the Russellian approach to
propositions, ⟨Socrates is wise⟩ is just the ordered pair consisting of Wisdom and Socrates,
so that there is a direct and obvious route from Wisdom and Socrates to ⟨Socrates is wise⟩.
By contrast, on a broadly Fregean approach to propositions, ⟨Socrates is wise⟩ is not a
function of Socrates’s wisdom.
Concerning Lesson 2. Davidson then considers treating ‘the proposition that Socrates is wise’ as
semantically unstructured. But if such expressions are semantically unstructured, then we
would do just as well to have referred to them using primitive symbols with no apparent
complexity. At this point, we would have introduced ‘an infinite primitive vocabulary’,
thereby ‘destroying all appearance of a theory’. This is exactly on a par with Potter’s point,
that the result ‘is no longer in any way explanatory of the general relationship which we
wanted to describe, but has to be expressed afresh for each’ proposition (2000, p. 124).
Concerning Lesson 3. Davidson entertains a ‘further proposal’, which explains intensional ascent
in terms of semantic ascent. Accommodating the point that this needs to be relativized to a
language, the ‘further proposal’ essentially comes to the following:
⟨…⟩ =df the proposition expressed by ‘…’ (in this language)
Davidson’s argument against minimalism consequently runs through all three of the lessons
from the Gray’s Elegy argument. Thus far, then, Davidson and I agree completely in our
objections against minimalism. However, we part company over why the minimalist cannot
explain intensional ascent in terms of semantic ascent in this language. 
Davidson does not explicitly state his reasons at this point, but we can reconstruct
them easily enough. Earlier in the paper under discussion (and elsewhere) Davidson argues
against theories of truth which involve explicit relativizations to languages as follows. Since
they involve relativizations to languages, each theory defines only a relativized truth
predicate. However, the theories themselves provide no account of what all of these diﬀerent
predicates ‘have in common’ (Davidson 1990, pp. 285, 288, 295; also 1996, p. 269). And this
is unacceptable, not least because we are given no ‘idea how to apply the concept [of truth]
to a new case, whether the new case is a new language or a word newly added to a language’
(1990, p. 287). Almost certainly, Davidson thinks that the same problem will aﬀect the
minimalist who seeks to make intensional ascent depend upon semantic ascent in this
language.
I am not sure whether Davidson is right about this point, but I shall not explore this
matter here. For present purposes, it suﬃces to note that Davidson’s ultimate objection
against minimalism is somewhat diﬀerent from my own. At the risk of repetition: my
objection is that, if intensional ascent depends upon semantic ascent in this language, then
the minimalist cannot address the challenge of comprehensiveness.
Nonetheless, Lessons 1–3 constitute a shared core between Davidson’s argument and
my own. Moreover, this core is also shared with Russell’s Gray’s Elegy argument. We all
agree that, having adopted a broadly Fregean approach to propositions or propositional
constituents, intensional ascent must be explained via semantic ascent in this language; and
we all agree that this is problematic; but we part company over why it is problematic.
VI. A purely functional view of propositions and the redundancy theory of truth
My central argument against minimalism is concluded. Over the next three sections, I shall
consider some possible responses from minimalists, and explain why they are lacking. In all
three cases, I shall focus exclusively on the case of truth, but similar comments will apply to
the cases of reference and satisfaction.
A central contention of the paper, so far, is that the various minimalist schemes (MR,
MT, and MS) cannot indicate a one-place function. In this section, I want to oﬀer a related
objection: if these schemes did indicate a one-place function, then we would not be pushed
towards minimalism, but towards the redundancy theory. 
Suppose that the minimalist simply insists that MT indicates a one-place function. In so
doing, she must reject a broadly Fregean approach to propositions (at least, insofar as she
wants to be a minimalist about the truth of such things). There may be some leeway,
concerning which approach to propositions she might adopt. For concreteness, though, I
shall suppose that our minimalist attempts show that MT indicates a genuinely one-place
function, by showing how to define it by composition from smaller functions. The relevant
functions are as follows:
T(x): a function which takes a proposition x as input, and outputs a new proposition
by predicating truth of x.
B(x, y): a function which takes two propositions x and y as inputs, and outputs a new
proposition by biconditionalising them, with x as the left- and y as the right-hand
side (as it were).
The minimalist may now maintain that MT oﬀers a linguistic gloss on the (genuinely) one-
place composite function, B(T(x), x). Call this approach to propositions, the purely functional
approach.5 (This approach is, of course, compatible with the Russellian view that atomic
propositions are complexes consisting of an n-place relation and n objects.)
My claim is as follows: if (if) there are propositions of a purely functional sort, then the
redundancy theory of truth is preferable to minimalism when it comes to such propositions.
To establish this claim, I shall show why the purely functional approach to propositions
overcomes a famous (and supposedly decisive) objection to the redundancy theory. 
The redundancy theory of truth holds that all truth-predications are eliminable.
However, it famously runs into diﬃculties when confronted with claims like:
(1) everything the Pope asserts is true
5 This approach was urged upon me (independently) by George Bealer, Ted Sider and Mark Jago. Many 
thanks to them all for discussions and correspondence on this point. Horwich indicates something like this, 
with his talk of ‘compositional structure’ (1998, p. 91) and ‘form’ (2009, pp. 43–5). Moreover, if the 
minimalist is prepared to countenance that propositions have constituents, then they seem already to have 
adopted (some version of) the purely functional approach.
This might naturally be read as follows:
(2) ∀x(if the Pope asserts x, then x is true)
Now, if truth were redundant, we would expect to be able to eliminate the truth predicate
from this sentence, oﬀering:
(3) ∀x(if the Pope asserts x, then x)
Unfortunately, this would have ill-formed instances, such as:
(4) if the Pope asserts Tarski’s favourite proposition, then Tarski’s favourite
proposition.
This is generally taken to be a knockdown objection to the redundancy theory of truth.
Indeed, minimalism takes itself to preserve the spirit of the redundancy theory, whilst
recognising that the redundancy theory itself must be abandoned (see e.g. Horwich 1998,
pp. 38–40).
However, the purely functional approach to propositions has no particular diﬃculty in
dealing with the proposition expressed by (1). To handle it, we first need to help ourselves to
two more functions, namely:
P(x): a function which takes a proposition x as input, and outputs a new proposition
by predicating papal assertion of x.
C(x, y): a function which takes two propositions x and y as inputs, and outputs a new
proposition by conditionalising them, with x as the antecedent and y as the
consequent (as it were).
If T and B are acceptable functions, then P and C are too. Finally, we need some operation
which applies to functions, such as: 
Axφ(x): when φ is a one-place function which takes an input x and outputs a
proposition by predicating F of x, this operation takes φ as an input and outputs
a proposition by predicating F of everything.
Some such operation is required by an advocate of the purely functional account of
propositions, in order to allow her to deal with those propositions which we express with
universal quantifiers. 
Now, C(P(x), x) is a one-place function from propositions to propositions. One might
worry that, if x is Tarski’s favourite proposition, then C(P(x), x) leads to the ill-formed (4).
But an advocate of the purely functional approach to propositions is already committed to
claiming that this is a mistake; for B(T(x), x) had better not lead to the ill-formed ‘Tarski’s
favourite proposition is true iﬀ Tarski’s favourite proposition’, in the same case. Accordingly,
since C(P(x) , x) is a one-place function, AxC(P(x) , x) is a bona fide proposition. Indeed, a
moment’s reflection indicates that it is just the proposition expressed by (1). But notice that
this proposition does not involve any predication of truth. Hence, on the purely functional
approach to propositions, we can handle the proposition expressed by (1) without invoking
truth. Truth is redundant after all!
We are now in a strange situation. On the one hand, there is a supposedly knockdown
argument against the eliminability of truth. On the other, the purely functional approach to
propositions (if legitimate) allows us to eliminate truth completely. 
In fact, there is no serious tension here. The original argument shows us that the truth-
predicate cannot be eliminated from our language without expressive loss. However, the
purely functional approach to propositions (if legitimate) allows us to eliminate truth from
the propositions we express with our language. This mismatch between propositions and the
language we use to express them is, in turn, readily explicable. The purely functional
approach to propositions countenances no fundamental distinction between predication and
logic operations: both are functions which invariably output propositions. Consequently, the
purely functional approach to propositions can see no real distinction between the truth
predicate and the truth operator.6 However, the truth operator, unlike the truth predicate, is
provably redundant. Ultimately, then, it is no surprise that the purely functional approach to
truth leads us away from minimalism, towards a redundancy theory of truth (for
propositions).
But all of this is just more salt in the minimalist’s wounds. The minimalist wanted to
maintain that MT indicates a one-place function into which we can plug any proposition, and
that this one-place function allows us to deal with all predications of truth. The purely
functional approach to propositions would enable us to make sense of this idea; but it would
equally show that there is no need to get involved with truth predications (at the level of
propositions) in the first place. And that is just to say that there would be no reason to be a
minimalist.
VII. Extended-minimalism and possible extensions of English
I have shown that minimalism cannot be formulated in terms of some one-place function (a
propositional structure). I now want to consider a minimalist who is prepared to concede
this point, and who attempts to meet the challenge of comprehensiveness in some other way.
This response was suggested by Horwich (1998, p. 19n3) himself, as a fallback in the event
that he was forced to abandon the idea that MT indicates a one-place functions.
Suppose that, for any proposition, there is some (possible) extension of English in
6 The truth operator is a monadic sentential connective, T, which we can characterise in several ways. 
Semantically: the semantic value of Tφ is always the same as the semantic value of φ. Proof-theoretically: 
the introduction rule is φ ⇒ Tφ; the elimination rule is Tφ ⇒ φ. The redundancy of the operator is obvious:
reading Tφ as φ vindicates both the semantic and the proof-theoretic rules governing the operator.
which that proposition can be expressed. This supposition is prima facie plausible, since if the
proposition is expressible at all, it is presumably expressible by augmenting English with a
new phrase. In that case, we could then meet the challenge of comprehensiveness by oﬀering
the following stipulation: the theory of truth is to consist of exactly the propositions which
are expressed by any instance of the scheme MT in any possible extension of English (as
understood in that extension of English). 
Of course, MT still contains angled brackets. In order to make sense of these, we shall
have to read MT as something like:
MTE. the proposition expressed by ‘p’ (in this extension of English) is true iﬀ p
For obvious reasons, I shall call this proposal extended-minimalism.
Extended-minimalism represents a significant departure from minimalism. Indeed, I
shall argue that it is such a departure from minimalism, that it is scarcely distinct from
alternative deflationary approaches to truth. I shall then argue that the extended-minimalist
has not succeeded in meeting the challenge of comprehensiveness.
Converging with disquotationalism. Among deflationary theories of truth, the closest
contemporary rival to minimalism is probably disquotationalism. Like minimalism,
disquotationalism begins with a scheme, which might be something like:
DT. ‘p’ (in this language) is true iﬀ p
The disquotationalist then claims that this scheme exhausts the concept of truth. 
As it stands, disquotationalism falls far short of the challenge of comprehensiveness.
After all, DT only provides truth conditions for sentences in this language, and tells us
nothing about the truth of sentences from other language. To avoid this point, the
disquotationalist is likely to supplement her theory of truth with a theory of translation. She
can then apply the truth-predicate to sentences of other languages, by coupling DT with the
clause:
for any language L, and any sentence x: x (in L) is true iﬀ there is some sentence y such
that y (in this language) is the translation of x (in L) and y (in this language) is true.
This goes some distance towards meeting the challenge of comprehensiveness.
Unfortunately, it does not go all the way: we are left in the dark concerning any sentences (in
other languages) which cannot be translated into a sentence of this language. (Compare the
minimalist’s diﬃculty, concerning propositions which are inexpressible in this language.)
Some disquotationalists are prepared simply to bite the bullet on this problem, and
deny that truth extended so far. Field (1994, p. 250) was one such disquotationalist; but he
soon came to accept that this violates our ordinary understanding of truth. So, in order to
meet the challenge of comprehensiveness, he suggested that we should not regard DT as an
axiom scheme for some fixed language (this one). Rather, we must be committed ‘to
extending [DT] as we expand the language’ for any ‘potential expansion’ of our language
(Field 2001, pp. 147–8). Call the resulting position quasi-disquotationalism.
As minimalism has become extended-minimalism, and disquotationalism has become
quasi-disquotationalism, the two rival theories of truth have all but converged. The first
diﬀerence was overcome when the minimalist glossed intensional ascent in terms of
semantic ascent. At this point, it shared with disquotationalism the idea that linguistic
expressions (of this language) are central to the analysis of truth. A diﬀerence still remained,
since minimalists attribute truth to propositions expressed by sentences, rather than to the
sentences themselves. But the significance of this diﬀerence has dwindled, now that quasi-
disquotationalists have appealed to a theory of translation which extends the truth condition
of a sentence of this language to all equi-translatable sentences of other languages.
Furthermore, the extended-minimalist and the quasi-disquotationalist have oﬀered parallel
responses to the challenge of comprehensiveness. In particular: both have recognised that
they cannot treat their initial ‘scheme’ — be it MTE or DT — as an axiom scheme in any
standard sense. The extended-minimalist contends that we are committed to any proposition
expressed by any instance of MTE in any ‘possible extension’ of English, and the quasi-
disquotationalist contends that we are committed to any instance of DT in anything we
regard as a ‘potential expansion’ of our language. What diﬀerences remain represent only
slight variations within a camp, rather than distinct positions on the philosophical
landscape.7
The point of all of this is simple. Minimalism purported to be a distinct rival to other
deflationary theories of truth. However, once we have given up on the idea that the theory of
truth can be formulated in terms of propositional structure, we have given up on much that
was distinctive about minimalism. Of course, this is not (yet) to say that the ensuing position is
wrong. It is merely to note that there are fewer varieties of deflationism than the literature
suggests.
The challenge of comprehensiveness again. I now want to criticise extended-minimalism directly, by
focussing again on the challenge of comprehensiveness. To frame the problem, I need to
clarify what, exactly, extended-minimalism amounts to. 
In invoking possible extensions of English, the extended-minimalist is not merely
maintaining that MTE is true on every (possible) assignment of meaning to ‘p’. For one thing,
that proposal would not yet provide us with any guidance on how to deal with the left-most
occurrence of ‘p’ in MTE, where it occurs in the context ‘the proposition expressed by “p” (in
this extension of English)’. For another, the extended-minimalist would have invoked the
notion of truth in the course of outlining the theory which was supposed itself to exhaust the
concept of truth. In so doing, she would surely have undercut her claim to be any kind of
7 cf. Field (2001, p.148). On one particular point of variation: Buchanan (2003, pp. 64–5) is rightly critical of
Field’s suggestion that whether an utterance (in some other language) is true depends upon how I regard 
that utterance.
minimalist.8
Instead, the extended-minimalist’s proposal must be something more like the
following: Any possible usage of an MTE-instance (where that usage counts as an extension of
English) expresses a proposition which figures in the minimal theory of truth. 
My concern with this proposal is relatively straightforward: it does not amount to a
systematic specification of a comprehensive theory of truth. 
To make this point, it will help if I first draw a couple of parallels. In §IV, I imagined a
minimalist who suggested that her theory of truth consisted of all of the correct instances of
MT2, but refused to say anything more about what correctness amount to. I complained that,
if she followed this course, she would not have systematically specified a comprehensive
theory of truth. In particular, she would not have provided us with any kind of tractable test,
which applied to each and every proposition, and determined whether or not it belonged
within her theory of truth. Similarly: when a correspondence theorist tells us that truth
consists in correspondence, and (inevitably) does not then go on to articulate this notion in any
detail, she cannot thereby claim to have systematically specified a comprehensive theory of
truth (I shall return to this point in §IX). Again: she has not provided us with a tractable test
to determine which propositions belong within her theory of truth.
My concern here is exactly the same. The extended-minimalist attempts to specify a
theory of truth by quantifying over all possible linguistic usage. So, until she has provided a theory
which details all possible linguistic usage, by all possible creatures, in all possible contexts,
she has not systematically specified a comprehensive theory of truth. Until she has provided
such a theory of all possible usage, the extended-minimalist has not given any kind of tractable
test, which applies to each and every proposition, and sorts them into those which belong
within her theory of truth and those which do not. However, it is simply fantastical to
suppose that we actually have such a theory of all possible usage; or, indeed, that we ever could
have one.
8 Horwich (1998, pp. 25–7) makes similar points himself, in a slightly diﬀerent context.
VIII. The importance of comprehensiveness
We keep bumping up against the challenge of systematically specifying a comprehensive
theory of truth. As a final move, then, it is worth asking why a deflationist should feel
compelled to take on this challenge. In particular, the analogy with the correspondence
theorist in the previous section might motivate a deflationist to make the following speech:9
The correspondence theorist claims that the essence of truth is that it consists in
correspondence. She does not thereby claim to have systematically specified a
comprehensive theory of truth. And no one faults her for this, particularly.
Rather, they fault her (if at all) on the grounds that the idea of ‘correspondence’
is obscure and useless.
In a similar spirit: I maintain that truth has no essence, so that truth does not
consist in correspondence, or in anything else. I add, by way of positive account,
that the truth predicate is a device whose utility is exhausted by its role in
allowing us to denominalise content. 
Now: why, in saying this, should I be obliged to provide a comprehensive theory
of truth, when you do not impose the same demand on the correspondence
theorist?
In reply to this speech, it would be inadequate simply to repeat the argument in favour of
comprehensiveness that I presented in §II. There, I pointed out only that a non-
comprehensive theory would omit some truth condition, and so omit something about truth.
Our imagined deflationist has freely conceded this point, and she does not much care, for her
point is just that truth has no essence.
There is, though, an important diﬀerence between the correspondence theorist and
our imagined deflationist. Our deflationist seeks to convince us that there is very little to say
about truth in general. Establishing this negative claim is rather hard. Indeed, the literature on
deflationism is littered with accusations from anti-deflationary parties that there are some
important general facts which (essentially) involve truth. The now-classic deflationist
strategy for dealing with such objections — employed by both Horwich (e.g. 1998, pp. 20–
25, 46; 2001, pp. 160–1; 2009a, pp. 48–50) and Field (1994, pp. 264–5) — is to attempt to
‘derive’ the general fact, from the deflationary theory of truth, together with some separate
theory which does not mention truth.
As an instance of this general strategy, we can consider Horwich’s attempted
‘derivation’ of the (supposed) general fact that it is desirable to believe all and only truths
(2009, p. 49). We start with a truth-free normative theory, consisting of all ‘norms of the
form’:
9 This speech was inspired by some probing questions from Daniel Nolan (though I do not want to put the 
speech in his mouth) and also by a remark by Armour-Garb (2012, p. 275).
(a) It is desirable that (one believe ⟨p⟩ iﬀ p)
Next, given all propositions ‘of the form’ illustrated by MT, we arrive at all ‘norms of the
form’:
(b) It is desirable that (one believe ⟨p⟩ iﬀ ⟨p⟩ is true)
And hence, by some supposed mechanism for generalisation, at:
(c) ∀x(It is desirable that (one believe x iﬀ x is true))
In explaining the strategy, I have followed Horwich in using the locution ‘of the form’;
however, the considerations of this paper show that we should be very suspicious of the
phrase. That said, the shape of the general strategy is clear enough. Moreover, we can see
how it would be adopted to fit a raft of alternative deflationary theories of truth. 
The general strategy faces several very serious obstacles in-principle (raised by Anil
Gupta (1993), Panu Raatikanen (2005), and Marian David (2007; 2008), among others).
Even waiving these, however, one thing is absolutely clear: the general strategy has no hope
of succeeding, unless the deflationist has access to a comprehensive theory of truth. If, for
example, the deflationist could only specify the truth conditions for those propositions
which are expressible in this language, then she will (at best) be able to explain the value of
the truths expressible in this language, and not the value of truth per se. The situation is even
worse if the deflationist has utterly eschewed the aim of systematically specifying truth
conditions; for in that case, we cannot even begin the purported derivation.
In short: if the deflationist wants to be able to convince us that she has not omitted any
important facts about truth, then she will need to provide us with a theory of truth that
addresses the challenge of comprehensiveness. And that is exactly what she cannot do. 
IX. Demotivating minimalism
In this paper, I have argued against minimalism. But knowing that minimalism is wrong
might not remove its temptations. With this in mind, I shall close this paper by rephrasing its
main argument slightly, with the aim of undermining one of the main temptations towards
minimalism. 
In the first paragraph of the preface to the first edition of his book Truth, Horwich sets
out his minimalist programme:
Perhaps the only points about truth on which most people could agree are, first,
that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true (e.g. the
proposition that snow is white is true if and only if snow is white), and, second, that
the underlying nature of truth is a mystery. The general thrust of this book is to
turn one of these sentiments against the other. I want to show that truth is
entirely captured by the initial triviality, so that nothing could be more mundane
and less puzzling than the concept of truth. (Horwich 1998, p. ix; Horwich’s
emphasis)
I want to focus on the first claim, ‘that each proposition specifies its own condition for being
true’. This is not a throwaway remark from Horwich; elsewhere he says:
the central principle governing our overall deployment of the truth predicate is,
very roughly, that each statement articulates the conditions that are necessary
and suﬃcient for its own truth. (Horwich 2009e, p. 15)
[The minimalist] strategy focuses on the way that every statement trivially
specifies its own condition for being true. (Horwich 2009f, p. 3)
Suppose Horwich were right about all this. Then it would then be a trivial matter to provide
truth conditions for each and every proposition: just let each proposition specify its own
truth condition. But, as the historical record shows, it is very hard to say anything more
about truth, beyond these (trivial) specifications of truth conditions. The reasonable thought
now arises, that there genuinely is nothing more to say. And so we have arrived at
minimalism.
The preceding line of thought is very seductive. However, the considerations of this
paper show that it is flawed at the outset.
Certainly it is tempting to say that the proposition that snow is white specifies its own
truth condition. After all, when we pick it out as the proposition that snow is white, its truth
condition is immediately obvious. However, we are not obliged to pick out propositions by
using the locution ‘the proposition that…’. We might, for example, pick out a proposition as
Tarski’s favourite proposition. Equally, we might pick out a proposition using some primitive
name, such as ‘q’. There is surely no temptation to say that Tarski’s favourite proposition, or q,
specifies its own truth condition. And this, even though Tarski’s favourite proposition, and q,
both just happen to be the proposition that snow is white.
This indicates that propositions themselves do not specify their own truth conditions.
Rather, a proposition’s truth condition is specified (in this way) precisely when the
proposition is picked out using the locution ‘the proposition that…’ (or, equivalently, using
angled brackets). 
Of course, the use of this locution amounts to something like our canonical method
for picking out propositions. And the very centrality of this locution explains why we are
tempted to say (mistakenly) that propositions specify their own truth conditions. Moreover,
if we could pick out every proposition by using a phrase of the form ‘the proposition that…’,
then it would simply be a harmless oversimplification to maintain that a proposition specifies
its own truth conditions. Whilst we could not rely on propositions to specify their own truth
conditions, we could rely on their canonical presentations to do the job for us.
At this point, however, the considerations of this paper kick in. This language does not
enable us to pick out every proposition using the locution ‘the proposition that…’.
Moreover, our understanding of that locution invokes semantic ascent in this language. In
short: the claim that a proposition specifies its own truth condition ignores the role played
by semantic ascent within this language. And this is no longer a harmless oversimplification.
It conceals the fact that minimalism cannot address the challenge of comprehensiveness.10
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